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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
OTHER CRIMINAL OR WRONGFUL ACTS
Evidence of Other Crimes-Non-Compliance with Notice Re-
quirement
As might be expected, a very large number of the cases
decided during the past year dealt with the admissibility of
evidence of extraneous crimes. In light of the possible prej-
udice involved, Louisiana R.S. 15:445 and 446 set the face of
the law against the admissibility of such evidence except in
exceptional circumstances.
State v. Prieur' and State v. Moore2 represent forceful
judicial implementation of the legislative policy against ad-
missibility of extraneous crimes evidence. 3 The Prieur deci-
sion laid down certain guidelines relative to the admissibility
of evidence of other crimes, one of which was that except as to
extraneous crimes admissible as part of the res gestae, or
evidence of convictions to be used for purposes of impeach-
ment, the prosecution is to furnish written notice to the de-
fendant in advance of trial disclosing the exception relied
upon for admissibility. What if the written notice is given,
denominating in good faith what the court considers an inap-
propriate exception, but the evidence is nonetheless properly
admissible under some other exception? This is the problem
addressed by the court in State v. Banks,4 perhaps the most
important decision in this area decided during the past year.
A majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court took the position
that under the circumstances, admission of the evidence did
not necessitate reversal, that the prosecution should not be
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
1. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
2. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
3. See the discussion of the problem in The Work of the Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525 (1975); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34
LA. L. REV. 443 (1974); Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To
Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case in Chief, 33 LA. L. REV. 614
(1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 30 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PUGH].
4. 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975).
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prejudiced for its good faith substantial compliance with
the Prieur guidelines. The guidelines are just that-guide-
lines, not sacramental procedural technicalities, indicates the
court. It is the purpose underlying the Prieur guidelines that
is so important, and the guidelines are to be interpreted in
light of their purpose.
Exclusiveness of 15:445 and 446 Exceptions
Louisiana R.S. 15:445 and 446 recognize three exceptions
to the other crimes exclusionary rule-knowledge, intent, and
system. State v. Prieur5 acknowledged two other exceptions,
both provided by statute: crimes forming part of the res ges-
tae6 and crimes for which conviction has been obtained and
the same is inquired into for purpose of impeachment. 7 Are
other exceptions to be recognized? Phrased differently, are
these statutory listings to be regarded merely as the type of
exception to be recognized, or as an exclusive listing? Other
states recognize additional exceptions8 and so do the Federal
Rules of Evidence.9 In State v. Banks,10 despite the concern
expressed by Justice Barham in dissent, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that under the narrow circumstances there
presented," other crimes evidence was admissible to show
identity. "Identity" as here used apparently means substan-
tially the same thing as the interpretation given "system" in
State v. Prieur12 and State v. Spencer.'3
Also, in State v. Graves'4 the court indicated that the
criminal flight of a defendant from the state to avoid prosecu-
tion, and a criminal attempt by him to procure false alibi
witnesses, are, under proper circumstances, both admissible.
5. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
6. See LA. R.S. 15:447-48 (1950).
7. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 180 § 1.
8. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 288-98 at 686-711 (Cleary ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICKI.
9. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
10. 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975).
11. The other crime was close in time, took place at the same location,
involved the same parties and was, said the court, "an almost identical
transaction." Id. at 598.
12. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
13. 257 La. 672, 243 So. 2d 793 (1971). For a case seemingly letting in
other crimes evidence to show "identity," but expressly treating it as sub-
stantially the same thing as "system" or "modus operandi," see State v.
Vince, 305 So. 2d 916 (La. 1974).
14. 301 So. 2d 864 (La. 1974). See discussion in text at notes 122-24, infra.
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CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Character of the Victim and Victim's Threats Against the Ac-
cused.
Louisiana R.S. 15:482 precludes a defendant from intro-
ducing evidence as to the dangerous character of the victim of
a crime or his threats against the accused absent "evidence of
hostile demonstration or of overt act." A surprising number
of cases decided during the past year concerned the subject.15
One of the most significant is State v. Walker,'8 dealing with
the relationship between the above article and Louisiana R.S.
15:447 relative to res gestae. After defining res gestae,17 sec-
tion 447 goes on to state that "what forms any part of the res
gestae is always admissible in evidence.' 8 Over protest by
Justice Dixon, the court in Walker took the position that be-
cause of section 482, a threat which otherwise would be
deemed part of the res gestae is inadmissible absent section
482's required showing of hostile demonstration or overt act.
The court arrived at this conclusion by reasoning that since
res gestae. is an exception to the hearsay rule, when the
hearsay rule is inapplicable, the res gestae admissibility rule
is likewise inapplicable.' 9 The reasoning thus would indicate
that nothing would be admissible as part of the res gestae
unless it would otherwise be excluded as hearsay.
It is submitted that the res gestae provision 20 should be
interpreted as not merely delimiting when certain hearsay
statements are admissible, but what evidence-statements
and non-statements, hearsay and non-hearsay-is to be
15. See State v. Singleton, 311 So. 2d 881 (La. 1975); State v. Rester, 309
So. 2d 321 (La. 1975); State v. Chapman, 298 So. 2d 753 (La. 1974).
16. 296 So. 2d 310 (La. 1974).
17. LA. R.S. 15:447 (1950) provides in part: "Res gestae are events speak-
ing for themselves under the immediate pressure of the occurrence, through
the instructive, impulsive and spontaneous words and acts of the partici-
pants, and not the words of the participants when narrating the events."
18. Amplifying the matter, LA. R.S. 15:448 (1950) provides: "To consti-
tute res gestae the circumstances and declarations must be necessary inci-
dents of the criminal act, or immediate concomitants of it, or form in conjunc-
tion with it one continuous transaction."
19. In this connection the court states: "Here, the fact of utterance only
is important. Hence, testimony of threats is non-hearsay. Since threats, when
offered in connection with a plea of self-defense, are non-hearsay, res gestae
has no application to them." 296 So. 2d 310, 312 (La. 1974) (citations of
authority omitted).
20. LA. R.S. 15:447-48 (1950).
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deemed relevant and admissible. For example, an act which is
itself criminal, such as a battery committed during the course
of a bank robbery, is, under proper circumstances, admissible
as part of the res gestae 2' even though, of course, the battery
is not in any way hearsay. Similarly, it is believed that such
statements as, "Give me your money," uttered during the
course of an armed robbery, though not hearsay, are gener-
ally properly admissible under the authority of Louisiana
R.S. 15:447 and 448.22
Further, it is submitted that the approach of the majority
in Walker ascribes much too broad an ambit to section 482. It
is believed that the section is generally directed towards bar-
ring threats occurring prior to the alleged criminal incident,
absent the prerequisite showing that tends to give them a
special relevance or meaning. It is urged that it should not be
interpreted to bar threats occurring contemporaneously with
the criminal act charged, that it should not necessarily bar
showing evidence of threats that legitimately form part of the
res gestae, as narrowly defined by Louisiana R.S. 15:447 and
448.23 The question, it is submitted, is fundamentally one of
relevance and of prejudice, not hearsay.
In State v. Harding,24 although noting that a trial court's
determination as to whether there is evidence of hostile dem-
onstration or overt act will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous, 25 the court stressed that the trial court's factual
determination is subject to appellate review. 26 Recognizing
that the prerequisite quantum of evidence was reduced by
the legislature in 1952,27 the court, upon analyzing the tes-
21. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443 (1974).
22. See Comment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Inpressions as
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969),
reprinted in PUGH at 494.
23. See State v. Cordier, 297 So. 2d 181 (La. 1974) (dealing with threats
against the victim by the defendant at the scene of the crime and statements
by him at that time as to prior assaults he had made on the victim).
24. 307 So. 2d 338 (La. 1975).
25. See also State v. Groves, 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975); State v. Jackson,
308 So. 2d 265 (La. 1975).
26. The court in the later case of State v. Groves, 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975),
seems to reflect less willingness to exercise the review power. See also State
v. Weathers, 304 So. 2d 662 (La. 1974).
27. La. Acts 1952, No. 239, substituted the word "evidence" for "proof" in
LA. R.S. 15:482 (1950).
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timony, concluded that the trial judge committed reversible
error in finding that the prerequisite had not been estab-
lished. The court hence reversed.
What is meant by "evidence" of hostile demonstration or
overt act? The court struggled with the problem in State v.
Groves.28 Despite the 1952 amendment to section 482,29 the
majority in Groves 30 took the position that testimony "does
not become evidence unless, in the opinion of the trial judge
charged with determining the weight of the testimony, it is
credible and competent to establish the facts which are
necessary to constitute a hostile demonstration or overt
act."' 31 In his concurring opinion in State v. Groves32 and his
dissenting opinion in State v. Weathers,3 3 Justice Tate argues
most persuasively that the purpose of the 1952 amendment
was to prevent the trial judge from rejecting testimony as to
bad character or threats made by the decedent against the
accused because he (the trial judge) disbelieved testimony
with respect to the alleged overt act or hostile demonstration.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Chemical Tests on Suspected Drunken Drivers-Qualifica-
tions for Person Making Blood Sample Analysis
In a decision with important practical consequences, a
unanimous Louisiana Supreme Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Barham in State v. Junell,34 held that the language of
Louisiana R.S. 32:663 concerning blood sample analysis is
mandatory, not directory. The cited provision spells out two
criteria for blood sample analyses, that they be performed by
methods prescribed by the state department of health and by
a person who has been issued a permit to do so by that
department. Relying on jurisprudence from other states and
persuasive commentary, the court held that the absence of
the described permit makes prosecution evidence as to the
results of the test inadmissible.
28. 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975).
29. See discussion in note 27, supra, and accompanying text, and Justice
Tate's concurring opinion in Groves, calling attention to the amendment.
30. See State v. Weathers, 304 So. 2d 662 (La. 1974).
31. 311 So. 2d 230, 238 (La. 1975).
32. 311 So. 2d 230, 241 (La. 1975).
33. 304 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. 1974).
34. 308 So. 2d 780 (La. 1975).
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EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Pre-Trial Access to Witnesses
In the very significant decision of State v. Hammler,35 the
Louisiana Supreme Court makes abundantly clear that it is
improper for a district attorney to advise prosecution wit-
nesses not to speak to defense counsel, and found that the
prosecutorial admonition "significantly interfered with the
defendants' constitutionally guaranteed right to effective
counsel. ' 36 Right to counsel, indicates the court, carries with
it the opportunity for defendant's counsel to prepare the de-
fense without such interference from the prosecution.37
Oath or Affirmation
In State v. Pace,38 the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's taking the testimony of a six-year-old child,
the victim of an alleged assault, without placing her under
formal oath. The court cited the Code of Criminal Procedure
authorization 39 to take testimony under either oath or af-
firmation and stressed that the trial court had made a careful
inquiry of the child's understanding of the obligation to tell
the truth. It found that in light of "the clarity of the court's
inquiries and the consistency of the answer,"40 in the context
of the proceeding the child had "affirmed" to speak the truth.
It appears, however, that the "affirmation" was inferred
rather than precisely so expressed.
Necessity of Mistrial Because of Improper Questions re Ar-
rests, Etc.
As an alternative basis for reversal, the court in State v.
Gaspard4' held that an improper prosecutorial question rela-
tive to other pending charges necessitated a mistrial and an
35. 312 So. 2d 306 (La. 1975).
36. Id. at 309.
37. The court relies heavily on a persuasive decision by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Gregory v. Unites States, 369 F.2d 185
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. 301 So. 2d 323 (La. 1974).
39. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 14.
40. 301 So. 2d 323, 325 (La. 1974).
41. 301 So. 2d 344 (La. 1974).
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instruction to disregard was inadequate protection. 42 In the
opinion of the writers the Gaspard case is sound.43 A later
case, however, State v. Hatch,4 4 without citing Gaspard, indi-
cates greater confidence in the efficacy of instructions to dis-
regard, at least when the question is "non-assertive" in
character.45
Unresponsive Answers by Police Officers
In State v. Johnson4 6 Justice Barham in dissent makes a
most persuasive argument that although generally "unso-
licited, non-responsive prejudicial and inadmissible testimony
by a witness is not imputable to the State, '47 a different rule
should apply to unresponsive answers by police officers.4s He
argues forcefully that in a criminal case "the police may be
seen as an integral part of the State prosecutorial team and
actions on the part of the police which deprive the defendant
of his due process right to a fair trial should be imputed to the
State."4 9 Thereafter, in State v. Foss,5 0 Justice Barham indi-
cated grave suspicion when reading
record after record in which experienced police officers,
educated and trained to testify, seemingly explode with
non-responsive, inadmissible remarks of great prejudice
when asked innocent questions by the State and the de-
fense.5'
42. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950) provides in this connection: "[No witness,
whether he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination whether
or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be questioned as to
conviction, and as provided herein."
43. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962
Term-Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 406, 409 (1963), reprinted in PUGH at 100;
Comment, Prejudicial Effects of Unanswered Questions, 19 LA. L. REV. 881
(1959), reprinted in PUGH at 95.
44. 305 So. 2d 497 (La. 1974).
45. Id. at 503. See also the analogous case of State v. Whitley, 296 So. 2d
820 (La. 1974), concerning a question as to a prior conviction where appar-
ently no such conviction had occurred.
46. 306 So. 2d 724 (La. 1975).
47. Id. at 731.
48. See discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 527 (1975).
49. 306 So. 2d 724, 731 (La. 1975).
50. 310 So. 2d 573 (La. 1975).
51. Id. at 577. Although contained in the majority opinion, Justice
Barham in this connection did not speak for a majority of the court.
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In State v. Smith5 2 the court, speaking through Justice
Tate, citing Justice Barham's dissent in Johnson,53 discussed
the problem in some detail and indicated that in the future the
court might well want to reexamine its position in this area.
Surely it does not seem unreasonable to insist that police
witnesses be instructed to confine themselves to answering
the questions asked only, and not to make references to such
things as prejudicial, inadmissible, extraneous crimes.54
Questions of Witness by Judge
To what extent may a judge properly question a Witness?
In State v. Groves55 the court, quoting and relying upon the
1943 decision of State v. Graffam,56 makes it clear that the
trial judge has broad powers to question a witness and
"where anything material has been omitted it is sometimes
his duty to examine a witness. ' 57 Further, said the court, in a
proper case the trial judge may himself recall a witness "in
order to supply an omission of proof on a material point."5 8
The supreme court was careful, however, to make clear that
in the trial judge's questioning of a witness he is to conduct
the interrogation so as to impress the jury with his impartial-
ity and not to indicate his opinion on the merits nor as to the
credibility of the witness. And of course, he is to ask no ques-
tion based on an assumption that the defendant is guilty.
Ambit of Cross-Examination
In State v. Sears5 s the court reiterated that on a hearing
outside the presence of the jury as to the free and voluntary
nature of a proffered confession, the defendant has the right
52. 310 So. 2d 580 (La. 1975).
53. 306 So. 2d 724, 731 (La. 1975).
54. See State v. Jackson, 301 So. 2d 598 (La. 1974); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L.
REV. 525, 527 (1975). In Jackson the police officer witness's reference to the
defendant's criminal and juvenile record was in reply to a question by the
state, and although the court found that the response contained improper
references, it concluded that under the circumstances of the case the trial
court's strong and prompt admonition to the jury was sufficient to avoid
undue prejudice to the defendant.
55. 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975).
56. 202 La. 869, 13 So. 2d 249 (1943).
57. 311 So. 2d 230, 240 (La. 1975).
58. Id.
59. 298 So. 2d 814 (La. 1974).
[Vol. 36
1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975 659
to take the stand limited to the voluntary nature of the con-
fession. The court made clear, however, that if he takes the
stand in the presence of the jury and testifies on the issue, he
is subject to cross-examination as to the entire case. 60 In light
of the United States Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Malloy
v. Hogan6 l making the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applicable to the states, an argument may
now be made that subjecting a defendant who takes the
stand in a criminal case to the broad rule of cross-exam-
ination may be unconstitutional.
62
Curtailment of Cross-Examination
State v. Thornton6 3 presents a fascinating question rela-
tive to curtailment of defendant's cross-examination of a
prosecution witness. Both Justice Calogero speaking for the
majority and Justice Barham in dissent recognize that under
United States Supreme Court authority,6 defense counsel
generally have an unquestioned right to cross-examine a
state witness to determine circumstances "identifying the
witness with his environment" 65 and making clear "who the
witness is, where he lives and what his business is. '' 66 Both
opinions likewise recognize that under certain circumstances,
such as where divulgence of place of residence would subject
the witness to physical danger, curtailment of this right
might be appropriate. The majority opinion relies heavily
upon the trial judge's per curiam as demonstrating such
danger to the state's witness and upholds the trial court's
refusal to make the state's witness (a narcotics agent) divulge
his place of residence. Justice Barham, in a very persuasive
dissent, stresses that under the United States Supreme Court
60. For a discussion of the matter, see The Work of the Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344, 345 (1972),
reprinted in PUGH at 91.
61. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62. See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925); discussion in
the Advisory Committee note to Federal Rules of Evidence 611(b) as origi-
nally promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, 56 F.R.D. 183, 274
(1972).
63. 309 So. 2d 266 (La. 1975).
64. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687 (1931).
65. 309 So. 2d 266, 267 (La. 1975), quoting from Alford v. United States,
282 U.S. 687 (1931).
66. Id.
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decisions the burden is upon the state or the witness at the
trial to show such danger, and that it is improper for the trial
judge in a post trial memorandum to make such a showing
dehors the record. The majority position seems to present
very serious federal constitutional problems and certainly in
the future, if presented with a similar case, the prosecution,
to protect itself, should attempt to make such a showing at
the time of the trial, with full right of the defendant to con-
test and controvert the claimed basis for apprehension of
danger to the witness.
Examination "Under the Rule"-Use of Testimony of One
Party Against Co-Party
Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1634 a
party may call his opponent or his opponent's representative
as a witness and examine him as under cross-examination
without "vouching for his credibility, or being precluded from
impeaching his testimony." May testimony thus adduced
from an adverse party be utilized as substantive evidence
against the adverse party's co-party? Following a long line of
cases commencing with a decision by a division of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court in 1923 in Edwards Brothers v. Berner,6 7
the First Circuit Court of Appeal in Adams v. Ross 6s holds
that it may not.
With much deference to the Edwards case and its prog-
eny, the writers suggest that a contrary position would be
much more appropriate and much more in keeping with the
end sought to be achieved by the statute. The so-called "rule"
embodied in article 1634 is a reflection of the fact that gener-
ally a litigant's opponent and his representative would be
adverse or hostile witnesses and hence that the prohibition
against leading or impeaching one's own witness normally
ought not to apply. But whether such a witness is or is not
adverse, he is nonetheless a competent witness-as to him-
self, his co-party, and the opponent who calls him. 69 It is now
recognized that when and under what circumstances leading
questions should be permitted is largely within the discretion
of the trial judge. Abuse of discretion in this area is rarely
67. 154 La. 791, 98 So. 247 (1923).
68. 300 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
69. See LA. R.S. 13:3665 (1950), providing that a competent witness is "a
person of proper understanding."
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sufficiently grave to cause the appellate court to ignore evi-
dence thus adduced, or to necessitate reversal.70 Of course the
mere circumstance that a party's co-party testifies to a par-
ticular fact would in no sense "bind" him, for technically a
party is not "bound" even by. his own testimony.71
In multi-party litigation if the position of Edwards per-
sists a party wishing both to utilize article 1634 and to have
the benefit of an opponent's substantive testimony against
the opponent's co-party must call the opponent twice-once
"under the rule" and once as his own witness. Such seems to
these writers unduly complicated and repetitious-also quite
a trap for an unwary litigant not familiar with the hyper-
technical interpretation given by Edwards.
The voucher rule itself is under serious attack 72 and
many, including the writers, would argue that whether one
should be allowed to ask leading questions 73 or impeach 74
should be governed by more liberal, less rigid rules.
Rebuttal and Surrebuttal
In his dissents in State v. Banks75 and State v. Jackson,76
Justice Tate argues persuasively that the prosecution may
not properly "divide its witnesses" and on the same point
offer some in its case-in-chief and some on rebuttal, and that
to allow it to do so may be very unfair to defendant. 77
70. See State v. Fallon, 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974), disccused in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L.
REV. 525, 533 (1975).
71. See Jackson v. Gulf Ins. Co., 250 La. 819, 199 So. 2d 886 (1967), dis-
cussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321, 326 (1970), reprinted in PUGH at 437; The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Evidence, 28
LA. L. REV. 429, 438 (1968), reprinted in PUGH at 438. See also the discussion
in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term-
Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 406 (1963), reprinted in PUGH at 439. Of course
because of the so-called voucher rule, under certain circumstances a party
may be precluded from impeaching his own witness. See MCCORMICK § 38 at
75-78.
72. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
73. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(c), as originally promulgated by the United
States Supreme Court.
74. See id. Rule 607, providing that any party may attack the credibility
of a witness, including the party calling him.
75. 307 So. 2d 594, 600 (La. 1975).
76. 307 So. 2d 604, 6d9 (La. 1975).
77. As to the prejudice that might result from "saved evidence," see
State v. Campbell, 263 La. 1058, 270 So. 2d 506 (1972).
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Although Louisiana R.S. 15:282 expressly provides that
"the defendant is without right to rebut the prosecution's
rebuttal," Justice Barham forcefully urges in dissent in the
Banks case that it would be unconstitutional to deny defen-
dant an opportunity, under the usual limiting conditions,
properly to impeach the state's rebuttal witnesses by extrin-
sic evidence on surrebuttal. 78 The writers agree. It is sig-
nificant that the majority in Banks did not deny that in a
proper case the defendant should be permitted to introduce
proper impeaching evidence on surrebuttal.
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Cross-Examination as to Details of Crime Underlying Convic-
tion
In State v. Jackson,79 although recognizing that prior
Louisiana cases have taken the position that a witness may
not be interrogated about the details of the crime underlying
his prior conviction, the majority of the court held that when
a witness has been convicted of a crime he may be cross-
examined as to its details in order to show "the true nature of
the offense."80 The court reached this conclusion by reasoning
that the orthodox rule in the area is based upon "a misappli-
cation of the rule concerning all past misconduct evidence,"8 1
that the details of the crime are relevant as bearing upon
credibility, and that in light of the conviction, risk of surprise
is minimal. Three justices dissented.
With deference, these writers agree with the dissenting
justices. The language of Louisiana R.S. 15:495 seems clearly
to militate against such questioning.8 2 A witness's other crim-
inal acts, although certainly bearing on credibility, generally
have relatively little probative value. Going into the details of
such other crimes may be a "rabbit track" and serve to con-
fuse the issues. Although the witness may not be "surprised"
78. 307 So. 2d 594, 603 (La. 1975).
79. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975).
80. The Jackson case is cited as controlling and is apparently followed in
State v. Elam, 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
81. 307 So. 2d 604, 607 (La. 1975).
82. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950) provides in part that "no witness, whether he
be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he
has ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be questioned as to convic-
tion, and as provided herein."
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by the facts underlying the conviction, the defendant who
called him may be shocked. Further, the jury is likely to give
undue weight to such other extraneous crimes and thus "tar
brush" the defendant with his witness's totally unrelated
other crimes. If the rule of Jackson applies to a defendant
who takes the stand, the prejudicial effect may be yet more
serious for there is risk that the defendant may be convicted
of the instant crime because of the egregious nature of the
details of former crimes.
The instant case affords an excellent example, it is sub-
mitted, of the harm that may result by injecting into a case
the details of a defense witness's other, and unrelated, crimes.
Defendant Jackson's alibi witness had admitted committing
the crime for which defendant was charged. On cross-ex-
amination he conceded that he had pleaded guilty to a differ-
ent, apparently unrelated armed robbery, presumably quite
an effective, and arguably sufficient, impeachment of the alibi
witness's credibility. The court concluded, however, that the
prosecution could, by questioning the witness, properly bring
out that the armed robbery occurred during the course of an
aggravated rape. It is quite possible that this other heinous
crime might somehow in the jury's mind improperly and illog-
ically have splashed over to muddy the defendant. It is sub-
mitted that whether or not defendant's witness had on
another occasion been guilty not merely of armed robbery but
also aggravated rape had very little to do with the witness's
credibility or with whether the defendant had committed the
instant crime.
The approach of the Jackson case seems to run counter to
important decisions of the court in State v. Moore83 and the
second State v. Prieur.4 Jackson is, however, a case of most
unusual facts; the crime for which the witness had been con-
victed did not indicate another and intertwined crime of a
83. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973), discussed in Comment, Other Crimes Evi-
dence in Louisiana-To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc. in the Case in
Chief, 33 LA. L. REV. 614, 627, 629 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 30, 42, 45; The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1974 Term-Evidence, 35
LA. L. REV. 525 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1978 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443 (1974).
84. 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973), discussed in Comment, Other Crimes Evi-
dence in Louisiana-To Attack the Credibility of the Defendant on Cross-
Examination, 33 LA. L. REV. 630, 644 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 111, 124;
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1978 Term-Evidence,
34 LA. L. REV. 443, 453 (1974).
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very serious nature. If the rule of Jackson were limited to this
situation, its impact would be desirably narrowed. Unfortu-
nately, however, the later case of State v. Elams5 indicates a
much broader application.
What Convictions May be the Subject of Inquiry?
For purposes of impeachment, Louisiana R.S. 15:495 au-
thorizes questioning concerning "conviction of crime," and if
the witness denies the conviction, it may be shown extrinsi-
cally. The phrase "conviction of crime" has been given a very
broad interpretation by the courts, to include very old crimi-
nal convictions 86 and misdemeanors.8 7 In State v. Bradfords
the court said that the section contemplated the showing of a
"conviction for the violation of a penal provision for which
imprisonment can be imposed,"' 9 and hence concluded that a
court martial conviction for absence without leave was a prop-
er subject of inquiry. From one standpoint (i.e., giving a
court martial conviction the status of a "crime"), the ruling
seems broad. On the other hand, the decision appears to add a
significant limitation as to what constitutes "crimes" for this
purpose, i.e., those offenses carrying the possibility of impris-
onment.9 0 In the opinion of these writers, the Louisiana legis-
lature would be well advised to limit use of convictions for
purposes of impeachment to those reflecting more'directly
upon truth and veracity.9 1
85. 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
86. See State v. Rossi, 273 So. 2d 265 (La. 1973) (a 25-year-old conviction),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1974). Cf. the limiting approach
taken in FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
87. State v. Odom, 273 So. 2d 261 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV.
443, 452 (1974).
88. 298 So. 2d 781 (La. 1974).
89. Id. at 792.
90. Cf. LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950), providing: "A crime is that conduct which is
defined as criminal in this Code, or in other acts of the legislature, or in the
constitution of this state."
91. FED. R. EVID. 609, for example, permits such use of the conviction
"only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court deter-
mines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonest or false state-
ment, regardless of the punishment."
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In State v. Williams92 the court makes it clear that
juvenile court adjudications generally may not be inquired
into for purposes of conviction-type impeachment. 93 The court
recognized, however, that in light of Davis v. Alaska,94 under
certain circumstances a defendant has a constitutional right
to inquire into a state witness's juvenile record in order to
show bias, interest or corruption.
Prior Inconsistent Statement-Limiting Instruction as to Ef-
fect
A few years ago, State v. Ray95 made it abundantly clear
that where a non-defendant witness has denied making an
out-of-court statement which, if given substantive value,
would tend to show the guilt of the defendant, the defendant,
if he requests it, is entitled to have the trial court give a
contemporaneous instruction to the jury that the testimony
as to the out-of-court statement is to be given impeaching
value only. Thus it is to be used only as going to the credibil-
ity of the witness on the stand, not to be given substantive
weight. If, instead of denying the out-of-court statement, the
witness under similar circumstances admits having made it,
is the defendant likewise entitled to such an instruction as to
its weight? In the important case of State v. Kaufman,96 the
majority, speaking through Justice Tate, makes it quite clear
that he is. The writers fully agree.
EXPERT WITNESSES
Testimony by Physician as to Basis for Diagnosis
Under certain circumstances, says the court in State v.
Watley, 97 in an opinion authored by Justice Tate, a physician
may testify as to what a patient told him pertinent to a
diagnosis in order to provide the basis for his opinion. The
92. 309 So. 2d 303 (La. 1975).
93. The court points out that LA. R.S. 13:1580 (1950) makes it clear that a
juvenile court status adjudication shall not be considered a conviction for
this purpose.
94. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
95. 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in The Work of the Louisi-
ana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306,
311-12 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 104-05.
96. 304 So. 2d 300 (La. 1974).
97. 301 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974).
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problem is a very delicate one, however, especially in a crimi-
nal case, and the court reviews the authorities and the limit-
ing rules evolved for the protection of the defendant.9 8
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
Informer Privilege
Although there was for a time doubt as to whether an
informer privilege exists in Louisiana, 99 it is now clear that
Louisiana courts will recognize a privilege as to the identity
of an informer under certain circumstances. 10 0 There are con-
stitutional limitations as to the applicability of such a privi-
lege, however,' 0 ' and the nature and scope of the privilege in
Louisiana is still undefined by statute.
The privilege was the subject of several decisions again
this year. Taking a receptive view to its availability, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court in State v. Rhodes 10 2 said:
The "informer privilege" is a privilege of withholding the
identity of an informant who supplies information to law
enforcement officials concerning crime. The privilege is
founded upon public policy and is designed to encourage
the reporting of crime. Disclosure of the informant's iden-
tity is warranted only under exceptional circumstances
for the prevention of injustice. The burden is on defen-
dant to show such exceptional circumstances. 
0 3
Drawing on earlier decisions, the court in State v. San-
tos' 04 said that the test to be applied is whether "disclosure of
the informant's identity [is] essential for the defendant's de-
fense on the merits or for his grounds for the motion to
suppress.' ' 0 5 The applicability of the test in a particular case,
98. See Becnel v. Ward, 286 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (La. 1974).
99. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 384 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 186.
100. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 313 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 187.
101. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). See also Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
102. 308 So. 2d 770 (La. 1975).
103. Id. at 773, citing State v. Dotson, 960 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972).
104. 309 So. 2d 129 (La. 1975).
105. Id. at 132. See also State v. Thorson, 302 So. 2d 578 (La. 1974)
(concerning the availability of the privilege).
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however, is difficult to determine indeed, 0 6 for under prevail-
ing Louisiana practice a defendant's inability to find out the
identity of the informant makes it peculiarly difficult for him
to demonstrate the benefits he hopefully would derive from
the testimony of the unidentified unknown individual.
The problem was creatively dealt with by the United
States Supreme Court when it promulgated the Federal Rules
of Evidence. In Rule 510 of the Rules as promulgated, the
Supreme Court provided that under certain circumstances a
trial judge can make an in camera investigation apart from
both counsel and defendant. 0 7 Congress, however, chose to
deal much less extensively with the privilege area, and this
rule and the other privilege rules promulgated by the Su-
preme Court were rejected by Congress. It is submitted, how-
ever, that Louisiana should give thought to adopting the ap-
proach taken by the United States Supreme Court in this
area.
An interesting question not previously decided in Louisi-
ana is whether the informer privilege is available as to infor-
mation provided not only to a law enforcement officer but also
to a legislative committee or a staff member thereof. In a per
curiam decision in In re Baer,'08 over a vigorous dissenting
opinion by Justice Summers, the Louisiana Supreme Court
avoided confronting the question full force in what Justice
Summers declared to be an "offhand fashion"' 0 9 of disposing
of the matter. The court in its per curiam stated:
The informer privilege-based on the need of assuring a
free disclosure of information to a governmental source
through assuring against unnecessary disclosure of the
informer's identity-is generally recognized in Louisiana,
although the promised secrecy may be required to yield to
competing interests of other constitutional or govern-
mental interest where circumstances show the overriding
weight of the latter. 10
It went on to find, however, that in light of the posture of the
case as presented,
[n]o practical result, therefore, can be effectuated by our
106. See State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (original hearing), 260
La. 500, 256 So. 2d 604 (1971) (rehearing).
107. 56 F.R.D. 183, 510 (1972).
108. 310 So. 2d 537 (La. 1975).
109. Id. at 541.
110. Id. at 538.
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ruling in the abstract on the sensitive and delicate ques-
tion of the separation of powers between executive (dis-
trict attorney), judicial (grand jury), and legislative (privi-
lege of aides against testifying) branches of govern-
ment. 1 '
Interestingly, the promulgated but unadopted Federal Rule
of Evidence 510 would recognize, under appropriate circum-
stances, a privilege as to the identity of an informer who has
provided information to a legislative investigating committee
or members of its staff.
Legislative Privilege
Is there some kind of legislative privilege available in
Louisiana as to the information derived by a legislative in-
vestigating committee and as to the names of informers who
supplied information to the committee or its staff? Further, is
such a privilege available to prevent disclosure before a
parish grand jury investigating the same subject matter as
the legislative committee?1 2 These questions lay at the heart
of the controversy presented in In re Baer,"3 but in light of
the status of the investigations a majority of the court con-
cluded that it would be unwise and inappropriate to differ-
entiate and decide the various issues. Justice Summers wrote
a vigorous dissenting opinion disagreeing with the court's
handling of the admittedly delicate issues presented in the
case.
Because of the interest and attention given the problems
of governmental privilege in the wake of the Watergate ex-
perience, it is to be anticipated that issues presented to the
court in this area will proliferate. Perhaps Louisiana should
give thought to formulating a statute that would regulate the




112. For a discussion of the informer privilege aspect of the case, see text
at notes 99-111, supra.
113. 310 So. 2d 537 (La. 1975).
114. See the efforts to do this in FED. R. EVID. 509 as promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court but rejected by Congress in favor of a much
more laconic approach to the whole question of privilege in the federal courts.
56 F.R.D. 183, 251 (1972).
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Grand Jury Proceedings
Following the reasoning of State v. Terrebonne,115 a ma-
jority of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Ivy 1 6 held
that because of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings it was
improper for the district attorney to use grand jury testimony
in cross-examination of a defense witness. Relying at least in
part upon the fact that when defense counsel had objected
the trial court had ordered that a copy of the grand jury
testimony be made available to him, the court held that under
the circumstances presented, the error was "harmless."' 1 7
The secrecy of grand jury testimony was also reaffirmed
in State v. Williams, 1 8 which denied that a defendant has a
constitutional right to see a transcript of prosecution wit-
nesses' testimony before the grand jury. However, it is
noteworthy that in concurring opinions in Williams Justices
Tate and Barham forcefully argued that once a defendant is
indicted he should have access to grand jury testimony. 1 9
HEARSAY
Admissions--Statements by Police Offered Against Prosecu-
tion
In State v. Carvin,120 the Louisiana Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Tate, indicates that statements of a
contemporaneous sense impression made by a police officer
during the course of a police investigation' 2' might well be
115. 256 La. 385, 236 So. 2d 773 (1970).
116. 307 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975).
117. For developments relative to the "harmless error doctrine" see text
at notes 174-80, infra.
118. 310 So. 2d 528 (La. 1975).
119. Id. at 536. Similar pronouncements are made in State v. Ivy, 307 So.
2d 587 (La. 1975), wherein Justice Tate, concurring, observed: "After indict-
ment, the importance of grand jury secrecy as to those witnesses who testify
at the trial is primed by the then more important value of fair trial for both
the state and the accused. This value is better served by permitting this
check upon truthfulness of trial testimony, rather than by permitting grand
jury secrecy to be used to cloak present trial perjury or inaccuracy." Id. at
593.
120. 308 So. 2d 757 (La. 1975).
121. See discussion of res gestae and contemporaneous sense impression in
text at notes 129-30, infra.
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admissible against the state as an admission, as a statement
by its agent. Normally in a criminal case the profession is
prone to think of admissions as statements made by the de-
fendant offered by the state, not statements made by an
agent of the state offered by the defendant. Thus the court's
suggestion has an intriguing potential for future develop-
ment.
Admissions-Attempts to Intimidate Witnesses and Flight to
Avoid Trial
In State v. Graves,122 despite the problems created by the
other crimes exclusionary rule,123 the court indicated that a
defendant's criminal flight from the state to avoid trial and
criminal attempts by him to procure false alibi witnesses are
admissible against him as admissions. Citing cases from other
jurisdictions, the court further indicates that when a third
party has attempted to induce a witness to testify falsely or
to fabricate evidence, such evidence may also be admissible as
an admission against the defendant, but "[b]efore such at-
tempts are admissible . . . there must be some evidence to
connect the accused therewith or to show that the attempt by
a third person was made with the authorization of the ac-
cused."124
Admissions-Plea Bargaining
In State v. Gaspard125 the court makes it clear that the
fact that a defendant has engaged in an unsuccessful effort to
plea bargain is inadmissible as an admission in a criminal
trial for the offense underlying the successful attempt at plea
122. 301 So. 2d 864 (La. 1974).
123. See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To Show
Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case in Chief, 33 LA. L. REV. 614
(1973), reprinted in PUGH at 30. For a discussion of this aspect of the Graves
case, see text at notes 5-14, supra.
124. 301 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. 1974). Justice Barham argues very persua-
sively in dissent that under the facts of the instant case, the prosecutor's
comments in his opening statement as to such matters were extremely preju-
dicial and should have been reversible error, for no evidence was adduced
indicating that the third person (defendant's wife) acted with his authority or
that any of the improper conduct mentioned actually occurred.
125. 301 So. 2d 344 (La. 1974). See also State v. Hammler, 312 So. 2d 306
(La. 1975) (Confessions should be cleansed of statements about unsuccessful
plea bargaining.); State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300 (La. 1975).
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negotiation. Although such negotiations are arguably rele-
vant, the policy of the law to encourage guilty pleas militates
against the admissibility of such evidence. 1 26 The Federal
Rules of Evidence take a similar position. 127 Like considera-
tions form the basis of the rule against the admissibility of
offers to compromise a disputed claim in civil cases.'2
Res Gestae--Contemporaneous Sense Impression
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize present sense
impression as an exception to the hearsay rule. 129 To some-
what similar effect, in State v. Carvin,130 the court takes the
position that a statement made by a police officer during the
course of a police investigation should have been admissible
as a statement of contemporaneous sense impression. A dep-
uty made the statement as he felt the motor of the car parked
outside defendant's home not very long after the alleged
shooting. His declaration that the motor was "cool" tended to
negative the prosecution's claim that the car had recently
been driven sixty miles.
Business Records-Computer Print-Out Sheets
The nature, availability and extent of a business records
exception to the hearsay rule in Louisiana civil and criminal
cases are all subject to doubt and confusion.' 3 ' The problem is
necessarily compounded when one is confronted with the ad-
missibility of computer print-out sheets in a criminal case.
Nevertheless, in State v. Hodgeson,'3 2 after a survey of recent
cases in other jurisdictions dealing with the problem, the
Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that under appropriate
circumstances, a telephone company's computer print-out
126. MCCORMICK § 274 at 665.
127. FED. R. EVID. 410.
128. MCCORMICK § 274 at 663.
129. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) excepts from the hearsay rule a "statement
describing or explaining an event or condition, or immediately thereafter."
130. 308 So. 2d 757 (La. 1975).
131. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 547 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 388
(1971), reprinted in PUGH at 490; Comment, Business Records in Louisiana As
An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 21 LA. L. REV. 449 (1961), reprinted in
PUGH at 476.
132. 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1974).
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sheets were admissible to show when and to whom the defen-
dant had made certain telephone calls. In so holding, the
court adopted with approval the criteria laid down by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, 133 coupled with limiting language
provided by a United States Court of Appeals judge.134
Former Testimony-Showing of Unavailability
For the state in a criminal case to utilize testimony of a
non-defendant witness given at a prior hearing, the witness
must be "unavailable.' 135 To show that such a witness is
unavailable, the state must show that a diligent good faith
effort has been made to locate him. 136 No such showing is
made, says the majority of the court in State v. Moore, 37 by
showing merely that the witness is absent from the jurisdic-
tion, and that according to the sheriff's return the maker
133. "[W~e hold the print-out sheets of business records stored on elec-
tronic computing equipment are admissible in evidence if relevant and mate-
rial, without the necessity of identifying, locating, and producing as wit-
nesses the individuals who made the entries in the regular course of business
if it is shown (1) that the electronic computing equipment is recognized as
standard equipment, (2) the entries are made in the regular course of busi-
ness at or reasonably near the time of the happening of the event recorded,
and (3) the foundation testimony satisfied the court that the sources of
information, method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its
trustworthiness and justify its admission." King v. State ex rel. Murdock
Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1969), quoted in 305 So. 2d at 428.
134. "If a machine is to testify against an accused, the courts must, at
the very least, be satisfied with all reasonable certainty that both the
machine and those who supply its information have performed their func-
tions with utmost accuracy. Therefore, it is essential that the trial court be
convinced of the trustworthiness of the particular records before admitting
them into evidence. And it should be convinced by proof presented by the
party seeking to introduce the evidence rather than receiving the evidence
upon the basis of an inadequate foundation and placing the burden upon the
objector to demonstrate its weakness." United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d
889, 894-96 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring), quoted in 305 So. 2d at 428.
135. A witness who at the trial takes the fifth amendment is deemed
unavailable for this purpose. State v. Dotch, 298 So. 2d 742 (La. 1974).
136. See State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Criminal Procedure
II, 34 LA. L. REV. 427, 437 (1974); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 547 (1975). The required
showing was found to have been made in State v. Green, 296 So. 2d 290 (La.
1974), and State v. Dotch, 298 So. 2d 742 (La. 1974). A divided court in State v.
Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300 (La. 1974), found that the required showing had not
been made.
137. 305 So. 2d 532 (La. 1975).
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thereof was "Unable to Locate" the witness. Emphasizing
that both Louisiana and Illinois (the state to which the wit-
ness had allegedly moved) had adopted the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings, 13 the majority of the court, through
forceful and eloquent decisions authored by Justices Tate and
Calogero, held that the error necessitated reversal. 139
Complaint to Police--General Rule
In State v. Murphy140 the court very properly held inad-
missible statements made in a complaint to the police by an
informer. There was no independent relevance to such state-
ments and the court, citing and relying on State v. Kimble14 1
and Favre v. Henderson, 42 held that although a police officer
may state that he made an arrest or search as a result of a
complaint, he may not properly relate the nature of the com-
plaint. The earlier view taken in State v. McLeod' 43 in this
connection, which in the opinion of the writers was erroneous,
appears rejected.
The salutary Murphy decision also seems contrary to obi-
ter dictum in the earlier and analogous case of State v.
White,'4 in which the court held that a teletype message from
another police department saying that a stolen vehicle had
been found in the possession of the defendant was admissible
as fact of utterance. It is believed that the classification of the
evidence as non-hearsay in White was in error, for in that car
theft prosecution the truth of the statement was of great
relevance and would impress the jury, whereas the relevance
of the contents of the teletype apart from its truth did not
appear to be very significant. Further, in White defendant
had no opportunity to confront or cross-examine the police
officer who sent the teletype message and thereby asserted
that defendant was in possession of the car in question.
138. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 741-45; 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 156-1-6.
139. For a discussion of harmless error in a criminaL case, see text at
notes 174-80, infra.
140. 309 So. 2d 134 (La. 1975).
141. 214 La. 58, 36 So. 2d 637 (1948).
142. 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
143. 271 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 455
(1974).
144. 301 So. 2d 321 (La. 1974).
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Complaint of Victim of Alleged Rape
In State v. Pace,145 following writings and jurisprudence
elsewhere in the country relative to complaints by victims of
alleged rape, the court held admissible a complaint of rape
made to her mother by a six-year-old girl the same day as the
alleged sexual attack.14 6 McCormick, before discussing the
origins of the special rule of admissibility in this area, indi-
cates that for a complaint of sexual attack to be admissible
there must have been no unexplained lapse of time between
the occurrence and the complaint, and the time lapse must
not be "inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense.' 4 7
Nothing in the Pace case violates the limitation.
A more questionable application of this rule of admissibil-
ity is found in State v. Brown.1' In Brown a bruised sixteen-
year-old girl, wearing different clothes from those she had
worn to school that morning, did not immediately tell of the
alleged rape when she returned home. After questioning by
her mother, she "broke down" and reported being raped by
three "boys" and explained that she didn't tell her mother of
it immediately because one of the boys threatened her life if
she reported it. According to McCormick, the origin of the
admissibility rule in this area "was to repel any inference
that because the victim did not complain no outrage had in
fact transpired.' ' 49 Since here it was not until after the pros-
ecutrix "broke down" under questioning by her mother that
the complaint of rape was made, it seems much more difficult
to fit the complaint under this special rule of admissibility.
DISCOVERY, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION OF EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Scope of Pre-Trial Discovery
In State v. Collins5 0 Justice Summers affords a nice col-
lection of cases and a summary of a defendant's current
145. 301 So. 2d 323 (La. 1974).
146. See also State v. Morgan, 296 So. 2d 286 (La. 1974), in which the court
found that a similar statement was adoiissible as part of the res gestae, a
basis also relied upon by the court for the admissibility of the complaint in
the Pace case.
147. MCCORMICK § 297 at 709.
148. 302 So. 2d 290 (La. 1974).
149. MCCORMICK § 297 at 709. See also 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1760-
61 at 170-175 (3d ed. 1940).
150. 308 So. 2d 263 (La. 1975).
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rights to pre-trial discovery in Louisiana criminal cases. In
State v. Breston,'5 ' Justices Barham and Tate persuasively
argue in concurring opinions that a defendant's right to pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases should be expanded. As Jus-
tice Barham indicates, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 703(b)'s motion to suppress a written confession or
inculpatory statement has now been read to include a motion
to suppress oral statements. 152 And as Justice Tate in states-
manlike language cogently observes:
... the requirements of a fair trial and of federal due
process rulings are harbingers of change that conscien-
tious prosecutors might well note .... Many if not most of
the enlightened prosecutors of this state are affording
pre-trial discovery beyond that minimum now required by
jurisprudential holdings of our state courts. By so doing,
they are not only living up to an obligation to assure an
accused a proper opportunity to prepare his defense, but
they also avoid courting the reversals that an obstinate
policy of non-disclosure inevitably will produce.
1 53
Pre-Trial Inspection-Radar Unit
One of the most important cases relative to pre-trial dis-
covery during the past year was City of Shreveport v. Scott.15 4
In a traffic case involving an alleged speeding offense, a di-
vided court in advance of trial granted writs and ordered that
defendant be permitted to inspect and test the radar unit and
the radar maintenance manual, under the supervision of the
trial court. The decision seems completely sound. 55
151. 304 So. 2d 313 (La. 1974).
152. Id. at 317. See State v. Jenkins, 302 So. 2d 20 (La. 1974); State v.
Davis, 300 So. 2d 496 (La. 1974), writ dismissal, 309 So. 2d 335 (La. 1974).
153. 304 So. 2d 313, 317 (La. 1974).
154. 303 So. 2d 173 (La. 1974).
155. See Barnard v. Henders.on, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), in which in a
case from Louisiana, a unanimous court stated: "Fundamental fairness is
violated when a criminal defendant on trial for his liberty is denied the
opportunity to have an expert of his choosing, bound by appropriate
safeguards imposed by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence whose
nature is subject to varying expert opinion." Id. at 746.
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Pre-Trial Discovery as to Defendant's Written and Oral
Statements
Although a defendant may not have the right to pre-trial
discovery of an oral inculpatory statement, a good faith de-
nial by the state in advance of trial that it possesses such
statement, says a divided court in State v. Boothe, 156 necessi-
tates reversal, even though immediately before the trial the
state complied with the requirements of Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 768 relative to giving of written
notice of intention to introduce inculpatory statements. When
the defense has made a proper demand upon the state as to
whether it possesses any written confessions, admissions or
statements, a divided court in State v. Hammler157 said that
the prosecution is under a continuing duty to notify defen-
dant of same.
Right of Defendant to Inspect Witness's Memorandum
Recognizing that defense counsel has the right to inspect
a memorandum used by a witness on the stand to refresh his
memory,158 the majority of the court in State v. Perkins159
held that if a police officer called by the prosecution has
referred to notes made by him shortly before trial from the
police report he has with him on the stand, defense counsel
has the right to see not merely the notes, but also the police
report itself.
A majority of the court in State v. Lane'80 continued to
adhere to the view taken by a divided court in State v.
Payton'61 that defense counsel has no absolute right to in-
spect a police report consulted by a police officer witness
outside the courtroom, prior to trial, to refresh his memory.
If, as demonstrated by State v. Lee,16 2 a defendant can bear
156. 310 So. 2d 826 (La. 1975).
157. 312 So. 2d 306 (La. 1975).
158. See State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L.
REV. 525, 534-35 (1975).
159. 310 So. 2d 591 (La. 1975).
160. 302 So. 2d 880 (La. 1974). See also State v. Graves, 301 So. 2d 864 (La.
1974).
161. 294 So. 2d 211 (La. 1974), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 534
(1975).
162. 311 So. 2d 876 (La. 1975).
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the difficult burden of showing that an out-of-court statement
made by an opponent's witness is inconsistent with the tes-
timony given on the stand, he has a right to force production
of such out-of-court statement.
PRESERVING RIGHTS FOR APPEAL
Contemporaneous Objection Requirement
In general, if evidence is admitted in a Louisiana trial
court without objection or with only a general objection,
rights on appeal are lost.16 3 State v. Bird64 presents a very
striking illustraton of the application of the rule, for there the
prosecutrix in a rape case, without objection, had been per-
mitted to testify in "response to questions about her fear of
defendant," that she
knew the things he has done. He tried to cut my hus-
band's throat with a razor, he stabbed a guy and almost
left him for dead, and he cut my husband's uncle across
the chest, and he beat his wife, and he knocked his
mother down-all of these things were going through my
mind at the time. 165
Applying the traditional rule, the court held that because of
failure to object in the trial court defense counsel could not
successfully assert his objection on appeal.
Although in general the contemporaneous objection rule
is sound, perhaps there should be some leeway to redress an
egregious error as to inadmissible evidence even in the ab-
sence of a contemporaneous objection. Perhaps Louisiana
should give thought to adopting an escape hatch provision
similar to that adopted by Congress in the recently enacted
Federal Rules of Evidence as to "plain error."'16 6 Although
163. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841-45, as amended by La. Acts 1974, No.
207. For recent cases decided during the past term involving the problem, see
State v. Oliveaux, 312 So. 2d 337 (La. 1975), State v. Craddock, 307 So. 2d 342
(La. 1975), State v. Bird, 302 So. 2d 589 (La. 1974), State v. Refuge, 300 So. 2d
489 (La. 1974), and State v. Hillman, 298 So. 2d 746 (La. 1974). When the
objectionable evidence violates a defendant's federal constitutional rights,
however, more protective standards adhere. See Comment, Post-Conviction
Remedies and Waiver of Constitutional Rights, 26 LA. L. REv. 705 (1966),
reprinted in PUGH at 567.
164. 302 So. 2d 589 (La. 1974).
165. Id. at 591.
166. FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
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adopting the contemporaneous objection rule as the usual
requirement,'1 67 the Federal Rules of Evidence provide in
Rule 103(d) that the court may take notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although not made the subject of
an objection.
Louisiana's provision in this area is more limiting than
the federal. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides that even absent an objection in the trial court the
appellate court may take cognizance of such errors "discover-
able by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings
and without inspection of the evidence.' ' 6 8 In State v. Oli-
veaux,169 Justice Calogero carefully outlined the ambit of this
review as including those errors reflected in
the caption, the statement of time and place of holding
court, the indictment or information and the endorsement
thereon, the arraignment, the plea of the accused, the
mentioning of the impanelling of the jury, the verdict,
and the judgment . . .the bill of particulars filed in con-
nection with a short form indictment or information ...
and in capital cases, a minute entry indicating that the
jury had been sequestered as required by La. Code Crim.
P. art. 791 [citations omitted]. 70
Offer of Proof
The necessity, nature and availability of an offer of proof
in Louisiana criminal cases has been cloudy.' 7' In State v.
George, 72 an opinion authored by Justice Calogero, the court
makes clear that to preserve his rights on appeal, a party
167. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) and (2), which provide that "(a) ... Error
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) . . .In case the
ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike ap-
pears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context; or (2) . .. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were
asked."
168. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2).
169. 312 So. 2d 337 (La. 1975).
170. Id. at 339.
171. In the civil area, however, it is clearly provided for in the salutary
provisions of LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1636.
172. 312 So. 2d 860 (La. 1975).
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prevented by the trial court from adducing evidence may, and




The "harmless error doctrine" has given Louisiana courts
much difficulty and still divides the Louisiana Supreme
Court. 174 The important case of State v. Michelli175 represents
a significant shift in the majority position. 176 Speaking unen-
thusiastically of the "harmless error rule," the majority
through Justice Dixon said:
"Harmless error" is a doctrine which permits an ap-
pellate court to affirm a conviction in spite of error appear-
ing in the record. It has been called a "cop out" for appel-
late judges-an abdication of the judicial function in
criminal appeals.
One of the few methods available for enforcing legal
and constitutional procedures in the system of criminal
justice is the reversal of convictions by appellate courts
for errors of law. The American experience, the experi-
ence of this court, in fact, is that nothing short of reversal
of convictions is understood or heeded by trial judges,
prosecutors and police. Warnings by this court that cer-
tain procedures are illegal are, in the absence of a rever-
sal, often ignored or misconstrued. If there is no penalty
for error in the apprehension and prosecution of offend-
ers, expediency seems to prompt a repetition of the er-
ror.
17 7
In Michelli the court found a violation of defendant's fed-
eral constitutional right of confrontation and concluded that
because of Louisiana's limitations on appellate review it was
173. The recently adopted Federal Rules of Evidence contain a helpful
express provision as to offer of proof in Rule 103(a)(2), set forth in footnote
167, supra.
174. For an excellent discussion of the federal constitutional test in re-
cent Louisiana jurisprudence, see Comment, Harmless Constitutional Error
-A Louisiana Dilemma?, 33 LA. L. REV. 82 (1972), reprinted in PUGH at 550.
175. 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
176. The rules announced in the Michelli case were followed by the court
in a 4-3 decision in State v. Herman, 304 So. 2d 322 (La. 1974). State v.
Murphy, 309 So. 2d 134 (La. 1975); State v. Moore, 305 So. 2d 532 (La. 1975).
177. 301 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. 1974).
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impossible for Louisiana effectively to apply the federal
harmless error test.l 78 The federal test, said the Louisiana
Supreme Court, requires a review of the entire record to
determine whether the guilt of the accused was overwhelm-
ingly indicated, and because of Louisiana's limitations on ap-
pellate review, 179 a Louisiana state court could not legally
make such a review. Further, the court pointed out that Lou-
isiana's harmless error test is stated in the disjunctive, and a
finding of any of the three aspects precipitates reversal. Since
here there was, in the language of the statute, "a substantial
violation of a constitutional or statutory right,"'180 reversal
necessarily followed.
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
Evidentiary Rules Applicable in Juvenile Proceedings
In a Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision Judge Watson,
speaking for the majority as to the propriety of receiving a
so-called "Confidential Pre-Hearing Investigation Report"
prepared by a juvenile probation and parole officer, stated:
We believe it to be reversible error for a juvenile court to
receive a report containing hearsay evidence, opinions
and recommendations prior to making an adjudication.181
In addition, the case affords a helpful discussion of the rules
governing procedures in juvenile court, and emphasizes the
importance and wisdom of sharply differentiating the adjudi-
catory and dispositional phases of a juvenile proceeding.
178. Both LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(c) and La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921),
limit appellate review in criminal cases to questions of law, and as pointed
out by the court, the limitation has been given broad scope. Further, the
court pointed to the limitations in appellate review imposed by the then
prevailing bill of exceptions procedure. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841-45. Al-
though the archaic procedure has been replaced by a much more enlightened
method, LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841-45, as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 207,
the change presumably would not dictate a different decision in the harmless
error context.
179. Id.
180. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921.
181. State ex rel. Simon, 295 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). The court
in this connection relied upon State ex rel. Elliott, 206 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1968), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1967-1968 Term-Evidence, 29 LA. L. REv. 310, 319 (1969), and In Re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also State ex rel. Simmons, 299 So. 2d 906 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1974). Judge Domengeaux argues in dissent that the Simmons case
should properly be considered a juvenile probation revocation hearing where
the constitutional safeguards are less stringent. Id. at 909.
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